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1 
LABOR POLITICS AND CAPITALIST 
INDUSTRIALIZATION 
On the night of June 6, 2011, migrant workers rioted in the southern Chinese 
town of Guxiang. The protesters were furious over an incident in which a fellow 
worker had been violently attacked while seeking back wages. On June 1, Xiong 
Hanjiang, a nineteen-year-old migrant from Sichuan province, went to demand 
2,000 yuan in back pay from the ceramics factory where he was employed. 
Rather than give him his wages, some of the bosses' relatives attacked Xiong with 
knives, cutting tendons in his hands and feet. Between June 3 and June 6, workers 
demanding justice for the victim protested in front of the municipal and town-
ship government offices, as well as at police headquarters. Protesters vandalized 
the government buildings, and a number of police were hospitalized with inju-
ries. On the night of the sixth, the workers originally surrounded the Guxiang 
government offices to continue to press their demands for harsh punishment 
for the attackers and fair compensation for Xiong. Things quickly escalated as 
physical confrontations took place with police, leaving dozens injured. Witnesses 
claimed that more than one hundred cars were smashed, though the official 
number was just nineteen. Widespread violence between migrants and locals 
ensued, with one migrant saying, "If you couldn't speak Chaoshan dialect [the 
local language], they would beat you."1 Riot police were called in to put down the 
unrest, and the town was placed under martial law for several days. 
While the extreme brutality of the attack on Xiong was shocking, this type 
of lawlessness was nothing new to migrant workers in Guxiang. A migrant with 
years of experience in the area would later recount how the government was an 
active partner in these regularly occurring acts of violence: "The first factory 
l 
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I worked in here was an [enterprise with strong government connections]. One 
of my colleagues was arguing with the boss over something, and the boss just 
placed a call and people from public security came by, tied him up, and beat 
him good. Around here, this kind of thing is a regular occurrence.... I'd say that 
the primary function of public security is to help bosses deal with workers."2 
Workers in Guxiang experienced many of the problems typical of migrants 
throughout China—low wages, long hours, few or no benefits, no contracts, and 
frequent nonpayment of wages. With the government firmly behind manage-
ment and nowhere else to turn, many migrants joined mafia-like "hometown 
associations." For a fee, these groups would help members try to resolve work-
place grievances—often meeting the threat of police violence with more vio-
lence. It later appeared that Xiong Hanjiang was a member of a just such an 
organization, as a Sichuan hometown association played a major role in the sub-
sequent mobilization. Thus, while the original grievance was rooted in a seem-
ingly straightforward labor rights violation, the June 6 protest quickly escalated 
into a major confrontation between migrants on one side and the police and local 
vigilante groups on the other. 
Hu Jintao had surely hoped a different method for resolving labor disputes 
would be in place nearly a decade into his term. Shortly after assuming Party 
leadership in late 2002, Hu had quickly—if subtly—moved to reorient the state 
away from the single-minded pursuit of growth that had characterized the 
administrations of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. Over the course of his first 
year and a half in office, he unveiled the key slogans that would be associated 
with his tenure: "scientific development view," "putting people first" and most 
famously, "harmonious society." Though each was imbued with a slightly differ-
ent shade of meaning, in sum these slogans were meant to indicate that the state 
would no longer be exclusively concerned with GDP growth as an end in itself. 
Under this new approach to development, the state was to pay greater attention 
to environmental protection, reducing inequality, expanding the social welfare 
system, and enhancing rule of law. In short, Hu wanted to take steps to soften 
the edges of the bare-knuckle capitalism that, while leading to many consecutive 
years of high growth, had resulted in stark class polarization, ecological destruc-
tion, and rapidly expanding social conflict. 
And indeed, over the next several years there were strong indications that 
the central government was backing away from full-throttle marketization and 
reorienting its growth strategy away from one highly dependent on wage repres-
sion and export-oriented manufacturing. Although calls for a shift away from 
exports grew significantly following the global economic crisis of 2008, the cen-
tral government had been advocating an increase of domestic consumption since 
at least 2004.3 In part responding to massive protests among laid-off workers 
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in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the high wave of privatization of state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) subsided. It became clear that the public sector was going to 
continue to play a large role in the economy, particularly in key industries such as 
energy, arms, transportation, finance, and education. Scholars and media com-
mentators began to refer to the phenomenon of "advance of the state, private 
retreat" (guo jin min mi) to refer to the process of renationalization happening 
in several sectors. A series of pro labor (in intent, if not necessarily in effect) poli-
cies and laws were implemented, culminating in the landmark Labor Contract 
Law approved in 2007.4 Additionally, the government took a number of steps to 
reform the discriminatory hukou (household registration) system (Wang Fei-
Ling 2010) and increase social insurance coverage of migrant workers, and it 
raised minimum wages. Most significantly for this discussion, the All China Fed-
eration of Trade Unions (ACFTU) appeared to be more aggressive in pushing 
for collective bargaining and unionizing private employers, as most clearly rep-
resented by the high-profile Walmart campaign in 2006 (Blecher 2008; A. Chan 
2007, 2011b). Unions around the country began to talk more assertively about 
organizing migrant workers and negotiating better contracts for their members 
to promote "harmonious labor relations." 
It appeared as if years of high levels of social unrest—chief among which was 
labor conflict—had taken a toll on the state, and the central government was 
ready for compromise. For some scholars, it seemed that the state had embraced 
decommodification and a reembedding of the economy in response to the 
chaos of the market, just as theorized by Karl Polanyi in The Great Transforma-
tion (1944). Indeed, Wang Shaoguang (2008) argued that by the late 1990s, "the 
golden tablet (jinzi zhaopan) of market reform toppled, shattering the seeming 
consensus on the efficacy of market forces.... [Those hurt by marketization] felt 
that Chinese economic reform had gone astray, and they longed for harmony 
between the economy and society. This initiated the protective countermove-
ment to re-embed the economy into the society" (21). In Wang's view, by 2008 
the central government's change in direction was successful: "By using state 
power, the redistribution breaks the market chain and reconnects everyone. 
These are the changes China has been experiencing recently" (22). 
It now appears that Wang's optimistic prognosis was premature—or at least 
only partially realized. Particularly for migrant workers—rural residents who 
are formally second-class citizens once they move to the city—the market nexus 
largely continues to mediate needs. Managerial autonomy remains essentially 
uncompromised, and workplaces are subject to endemic legal violations. And 
workers are not satisfied. Indeed, for the duration of the Hu-Wen administration 
(2002-12), the volume, and seemingly the intensity, of labor conflict increased 
dramatically. Officially adjudicated disputes rose continuously until 2007 and 
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spiked sharply in 2008 because of the economic crisis and the passage of new 
labor laws. While the number of disputes declined somewhat following the 
resumption of rapid growth in 2009, they increased again in 2012 and remain 
incredibly high in absolute terms (see figure 1). Autonomously organized strikes, 
road blockades, riots, and worker suicides continue to upend social order. In 
at least two high-profile cases, workers who murdered their bosses were widely 
hailed as heroes on the Internet.5 Just one week after the Guxiang riot, an even 
more spectacular worker insurrection took place in the Guangzhou suburb of 
Zengcheng. Workers blocked a national highway and set fire to a police station— 
and the unrest continued for days until the government deployed the military 
to quell the uprising. By 2012 the government was spending renminbi (RMB) 
701.8 billion (US$111.4 billion) on internal security, significantly outpacing its 
national defense budget of RMB 670.3 billion.6 Clearly, all was not peaceful in 
the People's Republic. 
This book, then, seeks to address a problem of the political economy of early 
twenty-first-century China: Why is it that in the more than ten years since the 
central government began to shift away from full-fledged marketization, migrant 
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FIGURE 1 . Labor disputes in China, 1996-2012. 
Source: Zhongguo laodong tongji nianjian (2012) [China labor statistical year-
book 2012] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe). 
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worker unrest has continued to grow apace7.7 Why have the efforts of certain 
segments of the state to promote class compromise largely failed? Perhaps 
one might assume that the answer is simply that there has been collusion between 
the local state and capital, unions are weak, and therefore worker interests con-
tinue to be violated. Indeed, there is strong evidence that even if migrant workers' 
nominal wages increased in this period, the workers did not experience signifi-
cant increases in real wages, and their wages relative to those of urban workers 
steadily declined (Golley and Meng 2011). But if this is the case, a second ques-
tion immediately arises: Why is it that labor is strong enough to win conces-
sions at the national and sometimes provincial or municipal level but not strong 
enough to allow migrant workers to significantly benefit from these victories 
or gain their recognition? In broad terms, I am interested in identifying what is 
particular about the labor politics of capitalist industrialization in a postsocialist 
political environment. In order to answer these questions, I focus on the state-
controlled unions under the umbrella of the ACFTU and their relationship to 
migrant workers, capital, and other state agencies. 
Insurgency Trap 
My central argument is that the dynamics of working class representation in 
postsocialist China have confounded institutionalization of class compromise. 
ACFTU-subordinate unions are weak at the enterprise level and are therefore 
unable to overcome endemic collusion between capital and local governments. 
Because unions in China are part of the state, they have good access to policy-
makers but are highly illegitimate among their own membership—that is, they 
are strong at the top but weak at the bottom. Labor's impotence within enter-
prises means that potentially prolabor laws and collective agreements frequently 
go unenforced—and since these unions are generally controlled by management, 
they are often uninterested in strict enforcement. Workers are therefore forced 
to take radical autonomous action in order to have their grievances addressed, 
often in direct opposition to union representatives. This means that when work-
ers secure marginal material improvements, the legitimacy of the union is not 
enhanced, leaving the working class unincorporated within the polity. Expand-
ing worker insurgency does strengthen the hand of unions at the national (and 
potentially provincial and even municipal) level, but it fails to produce a durable 
realignment of power at the point of production that is able to enforce laws. The 
one method likely to reduce conflict—developing an independent countervailing 
force at the point of production—remains off the table as far as the central state is 
concerned; hence there is an "insurgency trap."8 The central state is "trapped" in 
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the sense that it is unable to realize its own goals because of self-imposed political 
constraints. 
Through an analysis of several most-likely cases in Guangdong and Zhejiang 
provinces, I empirically demonstrate the problems generated by monopoly rep-
resentation and attempt to discern under what conditions insurgency trap might 
be undone. We will see that the ACFTU, despite being an exemplar of rigid oli-
garchy, is attempting to promote decommodification and gain recognition from 
its constituency in response to worker insurgency. I analyze how the union nego-
tiates the tension between the impetus to respond to intensifying worker resis-
tance on the one hand and structural oligarchy and heteronomy on the other. 
How then does the union try to ameliorate labor conflict given existing insti-
tutional parameters? What sorts of internal organizational changes are taking 
place? Given the failure of legal reforms to effectively incorporate workers into 
the state as individuals, can the union guide rebellious workers into rationalized 
legal channels? And can such legalized mechanisms resolve conflict? Although 
in general Chinese unions have not been able to decommodify and incorporate 
labor, there are some cases where they have been relatively successful. Even if such 
cases remain exceptional, the processes that produced a degree of institutional-
ization are worthy of investigation. 
There are important implications for theory that follow from this empirical 
investigation. The mechanistic theory of the double movement as outlined by 
Polanyi at first glance seems sufficient to explain the movement between corn-
modifying and decommodifying policies coming out of Beijing over the past 
thirty years. However, the countermovement is not simply a policy response but 
also a social response to market dislocations. When we look at ongoing lawless-
ness in private enterprise and expanding worker unrest, it is clear that the coun-
termovement in China is "incomplete" from a Polanyian perspective. As a result, 
I argue that countermovements must be broken down into two constituent but 
intertwined "moments": the "insurgent moment," which consists of spontaneous 
resistance to the market, and the "institutional moment," when class compromise 
is established in the economic and political spheres. This allows me to break with 
a teleological conception of the countermovement that assumes a pendular swing 
toward decommodification and reembedding of the economy. By reconfiguring 
the theory of the countermovement, I gain conceptual clarity on the relationship 
between spontaneous resistance to the market and institutionalization of class 
compromise. Specifically, we see how rejection of the market is merely a tendency 
and that the institutionalization of countermovements is always contingent on 
politics. Before detailing my conceptual framework at greater length, it will first 
be necessary to explain something about social and economic policy in contem-
porary China. 
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Commodification and Harmonious Society 
If China's command economy of the 1950s to the 1970s failed to result in the 
liberation of the working class, it certainly brought about a profound decom-
modification of land, labor, and money. With the implementation of the hukou 
system and the construction of the danwei (urban work unit) and rural com-
munes, labor markets were controlled administratively by the state. While there 
were certainly implications for worker democracy and autonomy, this system 
also meant that the state (or more precisely state-controlled work units) pro-
vided workers and their families with education, health care, and housing. Wage 
labor was greatly reduced or eliminated, and markets to provide for most human 
needs disappeared or were tightly constrained. Although there was ongoing 
abject poverty during this period, to the extent that people's needs were met, this 
occurred through nonmarketized mechanisms. 
Marketization was initiated in 1978 but deepened dramatically between 1992 
and 2002. But during 2002-12 the state began to shift tack and increased social 
spending and prolabor legislation under the banner of "harmonious society." 
The year 2002 should not be thought of as a rigid demarcation, but we will see 
that many important national policies began to shift in a seemingly decommodi-
fying direction around that time. As argued by Wang Shaoguang (2008), this 
could be seen as evidence that the Chinese state is doing precisely what Polany-
ian theory would have us expect and moving to decommodify the provision of 
various needs in response to social dislocations brought about by the free mar-
ket. Although this shift began as early as 2002, "common prosperity" received 
even greater emphasis in the eleventh five-year plan adopted in 2006 (Fan 2006). 
Perhaps this shift in direction is most directly reflected in new labor legislation 
passed during this period. But I am also interested in how provision for the core 
human needs of health care, education, and pensions changed, as the removal of 
these items from the market also serves to decommodify labor. 
While an in-depth overview of commodification of labor in reform-era 
China is impossible here, a few things are worth pointing out. To begin with, the 
implementation of the danwei and hukou systems in the late 1950s effectively 
blocked rural-urban migration and closed the labor market. Until the reforms 
began in the late 1970s, there were essentially no opportunities to engage in wage 
labor. Early private industry in the 1980s and 1990s was almost wholly unregu-
lated, and while labor was certainly commodified, the wage labor relationship 
was generally not formalized in contracts. The state began taking steps toward 
formalizing capitalist labor relations with the passage of the Labor Law in 1994, 
but migrant workers continued to be subjected to an essentially laissez faire labor 
market. 
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The Labor Contract Law of 2008 was seen by many as an attempt to both 
formalize wage labor and provide some better protections to employees. Of 
particular relevance to the question of labor commodification were the stipula-
tions on signing open-ended contracts—not surprisingly the feature of the law 
that employers resisted most vociferously. Although the intention of the law 
was to provide workers with greater protections, there is now evidence that 
capital responded to the new law by massively increasing use of "dispatch" (out-
sourced) and other forms of precarious labor. According to an ACFTU investi-
gation, between the implementation of the law in January 2008 and the end of 
2010, the number of dispatch workers leaped from 20 million to 60 million.9 
A broad array of industries and ownership types (state-owned, domestic private, 
foreign private) were increasingly using outsourcing to skirt legal obligations 
and social insurance payments. In fact, the state subsequently revised the law in 
an attempt to rein in the explosive growth in such contract labor. So even if the 
intent of the central government was to provide better protection to employees, 
it is not clear that this has necessarily been the case in practice. This is a clear 
example of how employers and local governments can circumvent laws intended 
to enhance the economic standing of workers. 
Perhaps the welfare issue that has generated the most vocal dissatisfaction 
within China has been the transformation of the health care system. Previ-
ously, urban workers received medical care through the danwei system at little 
or no cost, while 90 percent of rural residents were insured by the mid-1970s 
(Yuanli Liu 2004, 159). In the 1980s, however, the government began to move 
toward a market-oriented approach to health care, which led to the collapse of 
the collective medical system in rural areas (Liu, Hsaio, Li, and Liu 1995). By 
1993, the number of rural residents covered by medical insurance was down to 
12.8 percent, falling yet further to 9.5 percent by 1998 (Yuanli Liu 2004, 159). 
Throughout this period, out-of-pocket expenses increased dramatically for indi-
viduals. But as can been seen quite clearly in figure 2, out-of-pocket expenses 
as a share of total health care spending began to decrease quite significantly 
starting in 2001. And in 2002, the government unveiled the New Cooperative 
Medical System in an effort to increase insurance coverage in the countryside 
(Brown and Huff 2011). 
Similarly dramatic changes took place in the provision of education. Putting 
aside questions of quality, education under the command economy was pro-
vided by the state (broadly conceived) with minimal or nonexistent tuition. 
Starting in the mid-1980s, the central government moved to decentralize both 
control over curriculum and responsibility for operating costs (Hawkins 2000). 
One consequence of this has been the widespread adoption of various fees in 
public schools (Chan and Mok 2001) as well as rapid growth of private schools 
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FIGURE 2. Health care spending in China, 1978-2009. 
Source: Zhongguo tongji nianjian (2011) [China statistical yearbook 2011] 
(Beijing: China Statistics Press). 
(Lin 2007). Marketization was not limited to secondary and primary school but 
also had a profound impact on higher education (Mok 2000). Additionally, and 
quite significantly for this study, migrant workers' children face enormous obsta-
cles (financial, administrative, social) to enrolling in public schools in the city, 
and so they are often relegated to a much inferior system of private schooling 
(Chen and Liang 2007; Kwong 2004). 
The shift to increased government spending on education occurred somewhat 
later than was the case for health care. And yet by 2005, individual expenditures 
on education began to decline as state expenditures expanded (see figure 3). In 
2006, the central government required that provincial governments eliminate 
the random "fees" in rural schools that had grown rapidly since the 1980s, and 
it provided increased funding to the localities to ensure that this would hap-
pen (Brock 2009). The central government's renewed emphasis on education is 
reflected in the increase of expenditures as a share of GDP, particularly after 2005 
(see figure 4). Of course, this increased funding has not dealt with the problem 
of segregated schools in urban China, and profound class and regional inequality 
persists (Mok, Wong, and Zhang 2009; Qian and Amyth 2008). 
The pattern with pensions is somewhat more complex but follows a similar 
trajectory. Under the danwei system, worker pensions were provided and man-
aged by the enterprise. If there was unevenness in the generousness of the pen-
sions across enterprises, everyone was guaranteed some sort of protection in 
insurance by virtue of his or her position. The state did not provide pensions to 
rural residents, who had to rely on family and the commune/collective. 
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Nongovernment 
expenditures 
Government 
expenditures 
FIGURE 3. Education expenditures, 1992-2009. 
Source: Zhongguo tongji nianjian (2011) [China statistical yearbook 2011] 
(Beijing: China Statistics Press). 
FIGURE 4. Government expenditures on education as a share of GDP, 
1992-2009. 
Source: Zhongguo tongji nianjian (2011) [China statistical yearbook 2011] 
(Beijing: China Statistics Press). 
The process of marketization of pensions was really a subsidiary feature of the 
process of "smashing the iron rice bowl," or the privatization and mass layoffs 
of the state-owned sector, which accelerated in 1997. This process resulted in 
widespread banla-uptcies, as well as outright theft of pension funds, leaving many 
aggrieved workers with little means for subsistence (F. Chen 2000). However, as 
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FIGURE 5. Government expenditures on social security and employment, 
1978-2010. 
Source: Zhongguo tongji nianjian (2001-2011) [China statistical yearbook 
2001-2011] (Beijing: China Statistics Press). 
Note: "Employment" refers to training and services related to reemployment. 
Unfortunately disaggregated data are not available. 
Mark Frazier (2010) has shown, state spending increased significantly, largely 
in response to widespread unrest among laid-off workers (see figure 5). This 
increase in spending looks more dramatic than it actually is because it does not 
account for the rapid decline in spending by state-owned companies. Nonethe-
less, the five-year plan unveiled in 2006 called for 49 million more urban resi-
dents to be provided with retirement insurance (Fan 2006,710). And in 2009 the 
government initiated a plan to expand social pensions to rural residents, with the 
intention that 50 percent of them would be covered by the end of 2012 (Shen and 
Williamson 2010,242). 
Although the preceding account is far too brief and leaves many problems 
untouched, it is clear that the central government began to back away from the 
hypercommodification that characterized the 1990s and early 2000s in terms of 
labor market regulation and welfare provision. But an analysis of aggregate social 
spending and policy directives fails to capture ongoing power asymmetries in 
society, profound lawlessness, and the ongoing existence of social groups sys-
tematically excluded from increased spending. Chief among these groups were 
migrant workers, as expanded social welfare was largely directed either at urban 
or rural residents but not those in between. According to a national survey of 
6,232 migrant workers conducted by the State Council, in 2009 migrant partici-
pation in workplace injury insurance, basic medical insurance, and basic pension 
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TABLE 1. 2012 insurance participation rates among migrant workers 
Pensions 
14.3% 
Workplace Injury 
24% 
Medical 
16.9% 
Unemployment 
8.4% 
Maternal leave 
6.1% 
Source: "2012 quanguo nongmingong jiance diaocha baogao" [2012 National investigative report on migrant 
workers] Beijing: National Bureau of Statistics. 
programs was only 24.3 percent, 18.8 percent, and 11.5 percent, respectively (Li 
Wei 2011, 198). A different survey conducted by the National Bureau of Statis-
tics found slightly different, but still very low, numbers for insurance participa-
tion rates in 2012 (see table 1). The 2009 survey found that the top two reasons 
migrants were interested in getting urban hukou were "good education for chil-
dren" and "high levels of social insurance" (Li Wei, 129) While a large majority-
listed "wages" as their primary existing dissatisfaction, the next biggest concerns 
were "living conditions," "social insurance," and "health care" (128). It is precisely 
these sorts of issues that trade unions have frequently fought for in the process 
of capitalist industrialization. Without such representation, workers have been 
taking matters into their own hands. 
Worker Unrest in China 
At present, there is significant literature on how this process of commodification 
has generated worker unrest in China, but as yet there are no comprehensive 
studies on how the state and union are responding. The destruction of the danwei 
system that had previously integrated urban workers into state structures dur-
ing state socialism (Walder 1983, 1984) resulted in a loss of direct control over 
urban workers (Lau 2001; Solinger 1995), and there were massive revolts in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s (Cai 2002; Hurst 2009). Although many of these laid-
off workers have suffered immensely in the reform era and have had little suc-
cess finding reemployment in the private sector, municipal governments have 
greatly expanded social insurance coverage for them (Frazier 2010). But migrant 
workers, from the very beginning existing in a precarious economic position 
and with ambiguous legal status once in the city, have emerged as a new social 
class without an institutionalized channel for integration of collective demands 
into legalized mechanisms. The first wave of scholarship on migrants identified 
their legal and economic precariousness (Solinger 1999) and the frequently bru-
tal employment conditions they have been subjected to (Chan 2001; Choi 2003). 
Subsequent studies have focused on the volume and character of worker resis-
tance, which has remained largely focused on economic demands. But though 
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migrant workers are not explicitly political in their demands, there is an impor-
tant debate in the field focused on the question of class formation and subjectiv-
ity. Ching Kwan Lee (2007) has a relatively pessimistic perspective, arguing that 
legal reforms have given rise to a highly legalistic mode of resistance and that the 
state's project of individualizing labor conflict has been actively supported by 
unions and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) alike (Friedman and Lee 
2010). She argues that worker resistance in China is characterized by "cellular 
activism," in which insurgents are unable to construct durable organization or 
articulate political demands. On the other hand, Pun Ngai (2005) maintains that 
the category of dagongmei/zai (working girl/boy) represents a potentially sub-
versive discursive formation, one that could serve as the symbolic foundation for 
more broad-based mobilization. And indeed, she has found evidence of strikes 
spreading beyond single factories, a phenomenon she sees as an indication of 
heightened worker consciousness (Chan and Pun 2009). Despite his relative opti-
mism about class formation in China, Chris Chan's (2010) key phrase of "class 
struggle without class organization" (16) is an implicit recognition of current 
limits. Regardless of such different interpretations of working class subjectivity, 
there is consensus that capitalist development generated resistance that has been 
rapidly expanding in scope since the early 1990s and that this represents a major 
political challenge for the regime. 
My primary aim, however, is not to describe the dynamics of worker resistance 
but rather to provide an analysis of how the state, through the auspices of the 
unions, is responding to this conflict. Dorothy Solinger (2009) deals with this 
issue in her comparative work on labor politics under neoliberalism in China, 
France, and Mexico. We are in full agreement that a primary reason that worker 
unrest has been so persistent in China is the weakness of unions. However, her 
research analyzes how the state increased social spending to placate laid-off SOE 
workers. At the moment of exit, the state did not need to worry about the politi-
cal issue of incorporation, as is the case for the still-emergent migrant working 
class. In other words, Solinger's focus is the politics of the unmaking of a class, 
while I am focused on the politics of a class in formation. As noted by Ching 
Kwan Lee (2007), the expansion in legal rights for workers has been a primary 
thrust of the state's attempt to deal with increasing unrest.10 This response— 
which culminated in the 2007 passage of the Labor Contract Law—is an effort to 
integrate workers into the structure of the state as atomized individuals. In this 
sense we can see strong parallels with Hagen Koo's (2001) characterization of 
the relationship between state and worker in other export-oriented economies 
in East Asia.11 But as argued by Feng Chen (2007), the extension of individual 
rights in the absence of collective rights has failed to reduce labor conflict. The 
focus of this book is how the union responds to generalized worker insurgency 
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by attempting—within given political parameters—to incorporate workers and 
potentially advance decommodifkation. These issues are particularly pressing 
for the "new" working class—the 250 million rural migrants who have powered 
the Chinese economic miracle. 
Migrant and Urban Workers 
"Migrant workers" refers to people working in cities with nonlocal hukou. Hukou 
is an intergenerational system of formally tiered citizenship, in which the provi-
sion of social services is tied to a specific locality. People with nonlocal hukou 
do not have guaranteed access to public services such as health care, education, 
pensions, and subsidized housing and suffer various forms of political and social 
discrimination. The consequence of this is that migrants are formally second-
class citizens when they leave their place of hukou registration and go to work in 
the city. This system has allowed urban employers to pay less than the full cost of 
labor as the costs of reproduction are borne in the countryside. Although some 
local governments have experimented with liberalizing hukou requirements, the 
system still results in major administrative obstacles for migrants wishing to 
make a decent life in the city (Chan and Buckingham 2008; K. W. Chan 2010). 
Despite these ongoing challenges, there are now 250 million migrants living in 
China's urban areas.12 
In this book I focus on migrant workers rather than their urban-resident 
counterparts because migrants now constitute the most important section of 
the working class, not just numerically but also politically and economically. 
Economically, the highly commodified and precarious position of migrants 
is indicative of the overall tendency of the working class—that is, conditions 
for urban workers from old SOEs have converged downward. And politically, 
although it is difficult to determine with great confidence migrants' share of total 
labor unrest, anecdotal evidence suggests that they are the primary actors in con-
temporary insurgency—and in this sense they are less politically incorporated. 
Without a doubt, migrants are the central actors in posing offensive demands, 
while resistance among urban SOE workers has largely been defensive in nature. 
Politically, then, migrants represent the future of the working class. This is not 
to suggest that workers with urban hukou are without grievances—and as indi-
cated above, there is much evidence to suggest that with advancing marketiza-
tion, their concerns are increasingly similar to those of migrants. But the kind 
of widespread (defensive) militancy witnessed during the major privatization 
push in the late 1990s and early 2000s has subsided, if not wholly disappeared. 
To the extent that urban workers engage in overt resistance, it is likely to look 
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increasingly like migrant-style unrest, as the old danwei system of incorporation 
is increasingly inoperable. While I suspect that the framework developed here 
will also be useful in explaining the politics of urban worker unrest, I do not 
address this issue empirically in this book. 
Why China Is Different and Why It Matters 
In considering which features of China's labor politics are peculiar and which 
general, it is useful to consider the historical interplay between marketization 
and labor politics globally. In updating Polanyi, Burawoy (2008) delineates three 
historical waves of marketization, each generating a countermovement for social 
protection. The first wave led to the development of radical labor movements 
in the West, causing theorists such as Karl Marx to predict the imminent col-
lapse of capitalism. But this prediction was of course wrong, and second wave 
marketization emerged in the interwar period. Once again, this resulted in 
labor militancy, but by this time the state response was distinct from that of 
its nineteenth-century counterparts. Thus, in the countermovement under the 
second wave, the state established a set of institutional protections from the vaga-
ries of the free market, though this appeared in very different forms around the 
world—fascist, state-socialist, and various types of welfarism. While each type of 
state had a very different approach, in general labor movements were legalized 
and integrated into the structures of the state. We have been in the neoliberal 
(third) wave of marketization since the 1970s, during which time many of the 
institutional protections established by the state in response to the second wave 
have been undone. This includes social welfare provisions as well as a weakening 
of labor unions. 
China's experiences in these successive waves have been shaped by its con-
frontation with imperialism and the construction of state socialism. Beginning 
in the mid-nineteenth century, China was subject to imperialist aggression from 
Britain and other European powers, which eventually played a central role in the 
fall of the Qing Dynasty. Marketization in the interwar period was inseparable 
from imperial projects—now emanating from Japan as well as from Europe. As 
we will see in the following chapter, this meant that the response of both the 
Communist Party and much of the labor movement to second-wave marketiza-
tion was marked by the colonial encounter. ACFTU unions played a crucial role 
in early anti-imperialist mobilizations, and national interests were more central 
to their politics than were class interests. In the postwar era, the most impor-
tant institution for decommodifying and incorporating labor was the danwei, 
which provided the urban working class with permanent jobs and a wealth of 
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cradle-to-grave social services (Perry and Lu 1997; Walder 1983). Under this sys-
tem, the role of the unions was largely to administer the distribution of welfare 
to workers in the danwei. And marketization in China since the late 1970s has 
largely eliminated the protections afforded to the old working class while simul-
taneously producing a new working class composed of rural migrants. But up to 
the present, the Chinese state has been attempting to use institutions constructed 
during second-wave marketization to respond to the social dislocations brought 
about by contemporary marketization. 
In other words, the Chinese state is using state-socialist institutions to deal 
with the eminently (if not exclusively)13 capitalist problem of proletarian unrest— 
hence the postsocialist character of China's labor politics. But not all forms of 
postsocialism are the same, as China is remarkably different from former Soviet 
and Warsaw Pact countries in two respects. First, despite the persistence of state-
socialist-era union organizations in many countries in Eastern Europe (Clarke 
and Pringle 2009; Crowley and Ost 2001), a relatively liberal political environ-
ment (compared with that of China) means that there is greater pluralism in 
labor representation. Second and perhaps more important is distinct growth 
trajectories. While Eastern Europe was relatively industrialized in the 1980s, 
China was still an overwhelmingly agricultural society—and a poor one at that. 
If China's postsocialist experience is marked by explosive growth and the forma-
tion of a new working class, Russia experienced astonishing "involution" dur-
ing this period (Burawoy 1996). Although the worst of post-shock therapy has 
passed in Russia, and other Eastern European countries have not fared as poorly, 
this region has not experienced anything like the capitalist dynamism that has 
taken place in China. Nor has Eastern Europe had anywhere near the levels of 
labor unrest that China has experienced over the past two decades. Thus Chinese 
postsocialism is remarkably different from the post-Soviet variant. 
There are some parallels between Chinese labor politics and those of other 
countries in East Asia. The "Asian Tigers" of Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, 
and Hong Kong maintained greater political exclusion of labor than was the case 
in other regions (Deyo 1987, 1989). With the possible exception of South Korea 
(Koo 2001), workers were less militant than their counterparts in the West or 
Latin America had been at a similar stage of industrialization. Perhaps the closest 
analogue is Vietnam with its Leninist system of trade unions and high levels of 
worker unrest. Limited research suggests that the Vietnamese state is more toler-
ant of worker unrest, and as a result labor protest is somewhat more coordinated 
than is the case in China (A. Chan 201 la; Clarke 2006; Pringle and Clarke 2011). 
Although political exclusion is, at the most general level, common to all these 
countries in the early phase of capitalist industrialization, the Chinese state is 
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unusual in both its dedication to maintaining a monopoly on representation of 
labor and its coercive capacity to enforce this. 
At a very general level, there is nothing surprising about the fact that unregu-
lated capitalist industrialization has generated worker unrest in China—such 
dynamics have appeared in countries around the world for nearly two centu-
ries. But the specificity of postsocialist politics requires a somewhat different 
approach to studying this phenomenon in China. Whereas under second-wave 
marketization states had to decide whether/how to integrate worker represen-
tatives into the structures of the state, in China incorporation (see below for 
an elaborated definition) is the state's struggle to integrate atomized workers 
into the union, thereby rendering their struggles intelligible. Without legitimate 
representation—a potential means for co-optation—such a procedure encoun-
ters difficulty. If under second-wave marketization, the key site of analysis was 
between unions (as relatively unproblematized representatives of workers) and the 
state, the particular conditions in contemporary China imply that the focus must 
shift to the relationship between dispersed insurgent workers and unions. 
Although the theory of the countermovement is able to account for high levels 
of unrest and legislative efforts of the central government to ameliorate conflict, 
it fails to account for the politics of institutionalization in contemporary China. 
Finally, it is worth noting that labor politics in China hold profound conse-
quences for the future of global capitalism. China occupies an increasingly cen-
tral position in the global economy (Arrighi 2007a, 2007b; Hung 2009; Li Minqi 
2009), and the nation's leaders have lofty geopolitical ambitions. China's transi-
tion to capitalism has already fundamentally reconfigured the structures of the 
global economy. It is the world's largest exporter,14 one of the top recipients of 
foreign direct investment (FDI),15 the second-largest national economy, and it 
increasingly dominates the production of all sorts of goods, from the very low-
end and labor intensive to high-end and capital-intensive. Given the high degree 
of concentration of the globe's manufacturing, a shift in the country's mode of 
accumulation will reverberate internationally. Additionally, although China is of 
course dependent on the markets of wealthy nations, it is not politically or mili-
tarily subordinate to the United States in the way that Japan, South Korea, Tai-
wan, and any number of Latin American countries have been. China will increas-
ingly be in a position where it is less bound by external constraints than has been 
the case for many newly industrialized countries. The consequence is that if 
pushed in a prolabor direction by worker insurgency, China may be in a position 
to lead a decommodifying restructuring of global capitalism (Arrighi 2007a). As 
noted by Peter Evans (2008, 2010), any adequate response to neoliberal global-
ization must itself be global in nature, and China is the most important single 
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country in this regard. While the emergence of a globally oriented counterhege-
monic labor movement in China seems remote at present, such a development 
would have far reaching consequences. 
Countermovements and Appropriated 
Representation 
Just as Polanyi (1944) studied the great transformation of nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century Britain, I am concerned here with similar tectonic social and 
political shifts that derive from capitalist industrialization in contemporary 
China. Polanyi's theory of the "double movement" held that the commodifica-
tion of land, labor, and money would, if left unchecked, result in the destruction 
of society and the ecosystem. However, he argued that commodification gener-
ated a countermovement for social protection from various classes in society 
that would result in decommodification of labor (as well as land and money, but 
labor is most relevant for this discussion) and a reembedding of markets. One of 
his key examples of a successful countermovement was the American New Deal. 
Scholars have criticized Polanyi's conception of countermovements as being 
deterministic16 and functionalist (Munck 2004, 253; Dale 2012, 9-10). As Bura-
woy (2003) has argued, "Polanyi gives us a signpost to an architecture of counter-
hegemony even as he fails to appreciate the obstacles it must face" (231), which is 
to say he does a poor job of accounting for politics (Hwa-Jen Liu 2011,22). This 
is because in the original formulation of the countermovement, social resistance 
to commodification is conflated with actual institutionalized class compromise 
such as that which characterized the postwar political economy of North Amer-
ica, Western Europe, and Japan.17 If we were to uncritically apply this teleological 
framework to contemporary China, we would be unable to explain the persis-
tence of worker unrest in the face of major policy change from the center. 
I make several adjustments to the Polanyian theory of countermovements to 
account for this difficulty. As discussed above, the seeming inclination of the Chi-
nese central government toward class compromise has not resulted in a reduction 
in migrant worker insurgency, as labor remains highly commodified and labor 
conflicts often cannot be resolved by unions or through other legal means. Theo-
retically, this allows us to see that countermovements against commodification 
must be broken down into two distinct, if dialectically intertwined, moments: 
the insurgent moment, in which social groups marginalized in the process of 
capitalist development engage in disorganized and ephemeral resistance to corn-
modification; and the institutional moment, when durable class compromise is 
established in the political and economic spheres.18 It is important to stress that 
these moments refer both to particular events and to an aspect or instance of a 
LABOR POLITICS AND CAPITALIST INDUSTRIALIZATION 1 9 
broader tendency (in this case the countermovement). But I am not suggesting a 
strictly linear temporal progression from one moment to the next—empirically 
speaking, they will coexist as insurgency may generate an institutional response, 
and new institutions may create new forms of resistance. 
I conceive of migrant worker resistance in China as an insurgency rather 
than a social movement. "Social movements" as conceived of in classic works 
by political process theorists (McAdam 1982; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; 
Tarrow 1998) generally display the following characteristics: (1) relatively coher-
ent political program and well-articulated goals; (2) a preponderance of formal 
"social movement organizations," which are necessary in articulating said goals 
(Burstein and Linton 2002);19 (3) targeting of the state; (4) exploitation of politi-
cal space that is available in liberal democracies (e.g., through public marches, 
media outreach, political lobbying, etc.). These scholars of course acknowledge 
that there are all sorts of noninstitutionalized politics that are not social move-
ments, as indicated by the more general concept of "contentious politics" (Tilly 
and Tarrow 2007). However, I follow Ching Kwan Lee in adopting Guha's (1983a, 
1983b) more specific term of "insurgency." Worker unrest in China is cellular 
(Lee 2007), dispersed, fractured, and ephemeral; that is, worker organization 
is not durable across space or time. This resistance addresses only immediate 
economic grievances and therefore appears apolitical. But when viewed in the 
aggregate (either from the perspective of the central state or analytically), seem-
ingly apolitical eruptions of insurgency are responding to relatively uniform 
structural conditions,20 which is to say this resistance is eminently political. The 
unstated logic unifying disparate acts of insurgency is that of the countermove-
ment, which while lacking a coherent and rationally articulated set of demands 
is a tendency toward rejecting commodification of social life.21 Without legiti-
mate representatives that could develop rationally articulated policy proposals, 
the state is faced with a complex challenge: rather than responding reactively to 
rationally articulated demands (as is the case for states facing a challenge from 
a social movement), it must respond unilaterally and rationally in response to 
"irrational" insurgency that has posed no political demands. These are the politi-
cal dynamics of insurgency that sharply differentiate it from a traditional social 
movement. 
In my formulation, the institutional moment refers to the establishment of 
class compromise in durable organizational forms that grant economic and 
political power to subordinate social groups. I take decommodification of labor 
as an indicator of the emergence of the institutional moment in the economic 
sphere; decommodification is defined as social action that lessens the extent to 
which workers are immediately compelled to submit the satisfaction of their needs 
to the logic of the market. Things such as guaranteed health care, pensions, job 
security, increased wages, and having a say in how the labor process is organized 
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all contribute to decommodification. The political aspect of the institutional 
moment is represented by incorporation of the working class. This means that 
workers have substantive representation both on the shop floor (relationship to 
capital) and in giving the working class a voice in policymaking (relationship to 
the state). If workers are able to resolve collective problems and contend with 
capital within rationalized, legal channels (especially collective bargaining) and 
if they recognize the legitimacy of their legal union representatives, this serves as 
evidence of incorporation. 
Decommodification and incorporation are based on existing concepts, both 
of which I modify for the Chinese context. For Polanyi, "decommodification" 
remains vague and hardly an analytical term at all. But theorists of the welfare 
state, most notably Esping-Andersen (1990) have refined the concept in focusing 
on national policies that remove the provision of basic human needs (e.g., health 
care, pensions, education, housing) from the market. The key difference between 
my conception of decommodification and that of Esping-Andersen is that he 
analyzes national-level policies while I insist on determining whether potentially 
decommodifying policies/collective bargaining agreements are implemented on 
the ground. This is because one of the primary obstacles to decommodification 
in China is the strong alliance between the lowest levels of the state and capital. 
Potentially prolabor legislation and collective contracts often go unenforced with 
the implicit or explicit approval of precisely those officials who are supposed to 
enforce them. Thus it is necessary to enter the workplace to study decommodi-
fication in China. 
It is also worth clarifying my normative assessment of the term, as some may 
assume that decommodification is an unalloyed good from the perspective of 
workers. While this is certainly true in a number of cases, I am using the term in 
a strictly analytical sense to refer to the diminution of the extent to which labor 
power is bought and sold according to market principles. So for example, bonded 
labor is highly decommodified since there is no free exchange, but few would 
hold this up as a normative ideal. And decommodification may be pursued not 
only by workers but also by state and capital—one of Polanyi's major insights is 
that the self-regulating market creates chaos in society, not just for one particu-
lar class (even if the chaos is unevenly distributed). Perhaps Polanyi's greatest 
normative concern was whether decommodification and reembedding would be 
exclusive (e.g., fascist) or inclusive (e.g., socialist) in nature. 
As for incorporation, China once again calls for a reconfiguration of the 
concept as it has traditionally been used. Political scientists Collier and Collier 
(1991) conceive of incorporation in their influential work as follows: "State con-
trol of the working class ceased to be principally the responsibility of the police 
or the army but rather was achieved at least in part through the legalization and 
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institutionalization of a labor movement sanctioned and regulated by the state" 
(3) In both this work and other studies of Europe and Latin America, the question 
is how states deal with incorporating unions that developed independently (and 
that often had highly developed political agendas). Chief among these unions' 
political demands were official recognition and collective bargaining rights. 
But Chinese unions are already granted official recognition, collective bar-
gaining rights are enshrined in law, the constitution guarantees freedom of asso-
ciation, and workers have quite strong job protections on paper (e.g., working 
hours, vacation time, job security, health and safety). As with decommodifica-
tion, the question cannot be one of the existence of potentially incorporating 
formal rights and administrative arrangements. Rather, verification of incor-
poration must be done at the microlevel. Do workers recognize the legitimacy 
of union representatives? Do workers resolve collective grievances through 
rationalized official procedures? Do collective bargaining mechanisms allow for 
rationalized negotiation over pay and workplace conditions? In short, we must 
see whether formal state and union interventions (laws and collective contracts) 
are able to effectively regulate labor relations or whether workers continue to 
engage in extralegal activities to defend/advance their rights and interests. 
Decommodification and political incorporation are mutually reinforcing 
trends: to the extent that workers have greater collective voice in the state and 
workplace, their economic standing is likely to improve, and improvements in 
economic standing are likely to increase the legitimacy of union representatives 
and collective bargaining mechanisms. In China, the state and union were for 
a long time largely unconcerned with the economic problem, as evidenced by 
their presiding over a program of radical labor commodification since the late 
;; 1970s (Gallagher 2004, 2005; Kuruvilla, Lee, and Gallagher 2011). But over the 
\ course of the Hu administration, certain segments of the state (notably the cen-
tral government) became increasingly interested in expanding workers' ability to 
consume to promote economic "rebalancing." And the state has long been con-
cerned with the political problem of incorporation, as it fears the instability that 
may result from expanding labor unrest. But since the political and economic 
are intimately linked, some degree of decommodification will likely be neces-
sary in order to attain incorporation. Additionally, strengthened representation 
in the workplace—especially mobilizational capacity—could increase the power 
of union representatives within the state. 
A schematic of my reformulation of countermovements (figure 6) appears 
below. 
In these terms, then, my question is: Why did the countermovement in China 
stall at the insurgent moment? Why did high levels of resistance among migrant 
workers result in legislative, regulatory, and symbolic22 victories but did not 
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FIGURE 6. Schematic of countermovements. 
translate into incorporation or significant decommodification? My claim is that 
the transition from insurgency to the institutionalization of the countermove-
ment (i.e., class compromise) that we would expect based on Polanyian theory 
was confounded because the new class of migrant workers in China emerged 
under conditions of appropriated representation. This monopolistic setup resulted 
in the illegitimate political representation of workers by the ACFTU. 
"Appropriated representation" is a term originally used by Max Weber (1978, 
292), which he juxtaposed to the radically democratic "instructed represen-
tation" (293) but which he did not develop at any length. I have adopted and 
reconfigured the term to refer to a situation in which the state unilaterally grants 
exclusive rights of political representation of an entire class to a particular orga-
nization in the absence of substantive or formalistic delegation from membership. 
Historically, unions in many other countries undergoing capitalist industrializa-
tion have played a crucial role in channeling insurgent worker energy into the 
construction of collective power capable of winning compromise from the state 
and capital. But in the Chinese case, the ACFTU did not mobilize or actively 
involve itself in the lives of migrant workers as they emerged as a new class,23 
as it maintains the state's goal of reducing labor unrest. Under conditions of 
appropriated representation, dispersed worker insurgency strengthens the hand 
of union representatives at the national level (since the state fears instability and 
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may be willing to promote legislative reform) but simultaneously results in weak, 
illegitimate unions on the shop floor, which are generally incapable of enforcing 
laws and collective agreements. 
Appropriated representation may recall earlier definitions of corporatism, or 
more specifically "state corporatism" (Schmitter 1974, 103). Indeed, the corpo-
ratist framework has been popular in describing labor politics in China (A. Chan 
1993; Unger and Chan 1995), with some even arguing that China has shifted 
toward "social representation" (Yunqiu Zhang 1997). But why is appropriated 
representation a more appropriate concept for China's contemporary labor poli-
tics than corporatism (or one of its many variants)? The first reason is quite 
simply that corporatism implies that the group in question has been more or 
less incorporated into state structures. This may have been an apt description of 
the relationship between the working class and the state during the Mao era but 
clearly no longer is. A primary purpose of this book is to determine whether and 
under what particular conditions it may be possible to incorporate workers, a 
change that has certainly not yet occurred at the class level. A second and related 
reason is that corporatism (for labor) refers to a historically specific arrangement 
in which the working class was forced to abandon political goals in exchange 
for economic benefits. Whether in the fascist, state-socialist, or welfare state 
variant, corporatism implied that the state would preside over a regime of rela-
tively decommodified labor (as well as frequently providing representatives with 
material and symbolic benefits) in exchange for acquiescence to "national inter-
ests."24 The Chinese Communist Party has not been nearly so benevolent toward 
migrant workers, which means that the new working class is not dependent on 
the state in the way that workers in many Latin American countries were (Cohen 
1982). Third, corporatism frequently implied that independent, mobilized, and 
perhaps militant trade unions where to be tamed, co-opted, and integrated into 
the state, a situation clearly at odds with practices in contemporary China. Even 
in previous instances in which the state created new labor organizations to serve 
corporatist goals, few if any states have been able to police their labor monopoly 
as tightly as China. In other words, much as corporatism is a historically spe-
cific political arrangement (associated with second-wave marketization), appro-
priated representation is dependent on highly developed and competent state 
apparatus that can effectively crush alternative forms of political representation. 
State corporatism may accurately describe the relationship between the state 
and urban working class during the Mao era—but the institutions developed 
under this arrangement have not been able to incorporate the new working class. 
Empirically, this situation is no longer captured by corporatism. 
It is also worth addressing the much-discussed topic of union oligarchy, a 
line of inquiry first established by Robert Michels (1962) and carried into the 
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American context by Seymour Lipset and others (Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 
1956; Jacobs 1963). I do not conceive of oligarchy primarily as a union that 
fails to pursue the interests of membership (since "interests" are always the 
object of symbolic struggle) but rather in process-based terms. Unions are 
democratic rather than oligarchic to the extent that membership is actively 
engaged and mobilized in the determination of organizational ends of action 
and the pursuit of those ends. In other words, do workers have a say in what 
the union will do? And once organizational goals have been established, are 
workers involved in pursuing these goals? ACFTU unions are de jure subject 
to control by the Party from the national to the district level25 while remaining 
de facto subordinate to capital at the firm level. I do not, however, take a static 
perspective on union oligarchy but rather assume that it can be subject to chal-
lenge and revision (Vbss and Sherman 2000). And yet the relationship between 
the ACFTU and migrant workers is quite distinct from earlier instances of oli-
garchic unions. While some unions in the West were able to remain relatively 
democratic because of specific qualities of leadership or internal opposition 
(Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 1995, 1996; Stepan-Norris 1997), the general ten-
dency was for unions to begin quite democratic and to ossify over time into 
increasing oligarchy. However, the ACFTU was re-created in toto by the state, 
once in 1948 and again in 1978. It is this specific (Leninist) historical trajectory 
in the relationship between union, state, and working class that I refer to as 
appropriated representation and that puts the ACFTU in a different category 
than other unions. In my conceptualization, unions can be expected to behave 
"oligarchicly" under conditions of appropriated representation (i.e., they will 
respond to the wishes of state and capital while members will be excluded from 
practical activities). Whereas appropriated representation refers to the general 
processes of political representation, oligarchy (as juxtaposed to democracy) 
refers to the union's practical organizational activity. To put it another way, 
appropriated representation refers to the ACFTU's relationship to state and 
workers at the class level, while its relationship to specific workers on the shop 
floor is characterized by oligarchic behavior. 
The tension between the insurgent and institutional moments of the coun-
termovement can be best analyzed at the point where the state is now attempting 
to incorporate rebellious workers: the trade union structure. To put things con-
cretely, I am interested in how the state, through the auspices of highly oligar-
chic unions, deals with the problem of labor conflict in the process of capitalist 
industrialization and attempts to integrate workers into legalized channels of 
contention. This analysis requires an investigation into not just the relationship 
between workers and union (although this is the primary focus) but also these 
two groups' respective relationships to state and capital. 
LABOR POLITICS AND CAPITALIST INDUSTRIALIZATION 2 5 
Studying Chinese Unions 
Gaining access to Chinese unions is a significant challenge, and studying how 
unions respond to the crisis of worker resistance only compounds the prob-
lem. However, I had the good fortune to serve as an interpreter for prominent 
American labor leaders on several exchanges held with national leaders from the 
ACFTU as well as the Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions. Given this friendly 
introduction, I was able to meet people, conduct interviews, and gain access to 
information that I would not have otherwise. Additionally, while serving as a 
lecturer at Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou, my mother developed a close 
working relationship with the chairman of the Guangzhou Federation of Trade 
Unions, Chen Weiguang. Although certain activities of the unions remained 
highly opaque, the access I did secure would not have been possible without 
these personal connections. 
This book is based on ethnographic data collected during one and a half years 
of fieldwork in China. I spent approximately ten months in Guangzhou, with the 
remaining time divided up between Zhejiang province, Shanghai, Hong Kong, 
and Beijing (in descending order). My respondents include union and govern-
ment officials, workers, and enterprise managers. As anyone who has conducted 
qualitative research on sensitive topics in China will attest, such work requires 
a high degree of flexibility in approaches to data collection. Sometimes I was 
able to conduct formal, semistructured interviews; other times, I would not 
be afforded an interview but would be allowed to "chat." I attended numerous 
formal meetings between foreign and Chinese union officials and an equal num-
ber of formal meals. These meetings mostly took place during four separate mul-
tiday trips by Chinese and American delegations in 2007 and 2008, two each in 
the United States and China. As I befriended some of the younger staff of various 
unions, I would sometimes meet up with them for lunch or tea. With workers 
and managers, my methods were similarly diverse. Sometimes I would have sev-
eral hours to conduct a formal interview, or perhaps I would chat with a worker 
while playing a game of pool. Additionally, much of the data in chapter 6 comes 
from supervised interviews conducted by research assistants. 
In addition to interview data, I rely on media reports and historical docu-
ments. Although the media's ability to report on labor issues in China is con-
strained, it is not uncommon for strikes or other labor conflicts to be reported. 
In several instances, I found out about some incident in the media and then 
would conduct follow-up interviews with workers to gain a greater depth of 
understanding about the case. The historical data in chapter 3 come largely from 
collections of official documents stored at the Universities Service Centre at the 
Chinese University of Hong Kong. 
